



# National Public Opinion Survey

# 2025

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Since 2008, PAAIA has commissioned nationally recognized pollsters to survey Iranian American attitudes on important topics ranging from domestic issues to foreign policy preferences.

The first of their kind, these national public opinion surveys advance the voice of the Iranian American community by presenting accurate scientific data to policymakers and the media in order to better their understanding of Iranian Americans. PAAIA uses the results of these annual surveys to inform our policy stances as we advocate on behalf of the Iranian American community.



Learn more about PAAIA's National Public Opinion Surveys by visiting  
<https://paaia.org/educate/surveys>

# Executive Summary

## Iranian Americans Face Difficulties Communicating with Family in Iran and Coordinating Visits; Strongly Back Temporary Family Visitation Act; Majority Have Faced Discrimination Here in the U.S.; Support Human Rights, Humanitarian Relief, and the Iranian People as Priorities for U.S.–Iran Policy

From October 7–24, 2025, SurveyUSA conducted a **national survey of Iranian Americans** on behalf of Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA) with a conservative median credibility interval: **±5.2%**. Presented below is a summary of the findings, followed by data tables, with trend data when available, and a narrative of the results.

### Family Ties and Communication

An overwhelming **88%** of Iranian Americans report having family members currently living in Iran, including **26%** with immediate relatives such as parents, siblings, or children. Among those who immigrated within the past 25 years, **nearly 50% still have immediate family there**.

Communication with family members in Iran remains frequent despite obstacles. **Sixty-one percent** speak with relatives at least several times a year, and **43%** do so monthly or more often.

Most rely on digital platforms to stay in touch:

- **67%** use messaging apps such as WhatsApp or Telegram
- **38%** use video calls such as Skype or FaceTime
- **36%** use social media platforms like Facebook or Instagram
- **32%** rely on traditional phone calls, especially older respondents
- **9%** use email

The Islamic Republic's restrictions on internet access have taken a heavy toll: **40%** of Iranian Americans say the regime's actions—**slowing speeds, banning apps, or cutting access**—have very negatively affected their ability to communicate, and another **33%** say they've been somewhat affected.

# Executive Summary (Continued)

## Travel and Visitation Challenges

Travel between Iran and the United States remains difficult. Among those with family in Iran, **59%** report their relatives faced major visa problems—**43%** were unable to secure visas—while another **16%** of respondents say they faced significant hurdles. Only **15%** say family members obtained travel visas easily.

Support for the **Temporary Family Visitation Act (TFVA)** is overwhelming, with **75%** in favor and only **13%** opposed. The Act would create a new visa category for short-term family visits.

The survey reports that just **27%** of Iranian Americans support President Trump's broad travel ban on Iran, but **67%** favor a more limited version that would target Iranian regime officials and their family members while allowing ordinary Iranians to study, work, or visit the United States.

About one-third (**30%**) of Iranian Americans have never been to Iran. Another **22%** of respondents have not returned since emigrating. Of the remaining respondents who do visit Iran, **30%** report at least one visit, while **13%** say they travel every two to three years, and **4%** once a year or more.

U.S. State Department travel warnings play a role in decision-making: **34%** of respondents say the warnings significantly affect their plans, and **23%** say the warnings have some influence.

## Discrimination in the United States

More than half of Iranian Americans (**53%**) say they or someone close to them has experienced discrimination in the U.S. because of their ethnicity or national origin. The problem is most acute among younger Iranian Americans (**63% of those aged 18–34**).

Of those reporting discrimination:

- **77%** cite social discrimination
- **54%** report bias by airlines or airport security
- **35%** have faced employment or business discrimination
- **29%** have encountered discrimination by immigration officials
- **28%** have experienced it from law enforcement

# Executive Summary (Continued)

## Priorities on U.S.–Iran Relations

Iranian Americans' top priorities towards U.S.–Iran relations are promoting regime change (44%) and promoting human rights and democracy in Iran (41%). Other concerns include lifting sanctions (22%), preventing regional conflict (21%), limiting Iran's support for terrorism (19%), negotiating a new nuclear deal (16%), and tightening sanctions (14%).

When it comes to deal making with Iran, a plurality (38%) favor a comprehensive new U.S.–Iran agreement that addresses nuclear, regional, and human rights issues. A minority (17%) want a return to the 2015 nuclear deal, and nearly a third (32%) prefer no deal at all.

When asked how the U.S. government should support the Woman, Life, Freedom movement:

- 22% favor recognizing and advocating for political prisoners and human rights defenders
- 16% favor expanding visas for Iranians fleeing persecution
- 13% support internet access initiatives
- 13% support sanctions on human rights violators
- 9% favor aid to nonviolent activists
- 15% say the U.S. should stay out of the movement

## U.S. Airstrikes and Iran's Future Government

Iranian Americans are evenly divided over the June 2025 U.S. airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities: 45% agree with the strikes and 44% disagree. Among opponents, 56% cite fear of civilian casualties as their main concern.

When asked what type of government they believe would work best in Iran, a majority (55%) favor a parliamentary democracy or republic, while 17% support a constitutional monarchy. A very small number of respondents prefer a reformed Islamic republic (6%) or maintaining the current system (3%).

# Analysis

## I. Connections and Communications with Iran

Do you have any of the following family members currently living in Iran?  
(Select all that apply.)

Relationship Type	2023	2024	2025
Immediate family (parent, sibling, spouse, or child)	46%	36%	26%
Grandparent or grandchild	29%	18%	12%
Aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew	61%	60%	49%
Cousin or other extended/distant family member	67%	66%	65%
I do not have any family in Iran	5%	7%	12%
Not sure	1%	1%	—

Direct familial ties between Iranian Americans and relatives in Iran remain strong but have declined modestly since 2023. In 2025, 88% of respondents report having family in Iran, down slightly from 93% in 2024. About one in four (26%) have immediate family there, a decrease from 36% in 2024 and 46% in 2023. Two-thirds (65%) have extended relatives such as cousins, which is similar to prior years' results. Intergenerational connections—grandparents or grandchildren—fell to 12%, reflecting the community's aging profile and fewer recent arrivals. Overall, while the share of respondents with immediate family in Iran continues to decline, extended family ties remain widespread, underscoring the enduring familial and emotional connections that link Iranian Americans to Iran.

How often do you communicate with your family and friends in Iran?

Frequency of Communication	2017	2019	2020	2023	2024	2025
Daily	8%	15%	15%	13%	12%	8%
Several times a week	17%	26%	26%	31%	34%	15%
Several times a month	30%	26%	27%	29%	27%	20%
Several times a year	16%	14%	9%	10%	11%	18%
Less frequently	16%	10%	8%	8%	7%	21%
Not at all	13%	10%	6%	9%	9%	18%

The frequency of communication between Iranian Americans and family or friends in Iran declined markedly in 2025 compared to prior years. Only 23% now communicate at least weekly (8% daily, 15% several times a week - higher among those whose families came to the US in the 1990s or later and among Republicans), roughly half the share observed in 2023–2024 when nearly 46% reported such frequent contact. Another 20% are in touch several times a month, but 39% report communicating only a few times per year or less—an increase from 18% two years ago. These changes likely reflect the combined effects of tightened internet restrictions within Iran, aging family structures, and a waning first-generation population. Despite technological access, routine communication appears more sporadic and less consistent than in earlier surveys.

# Analysis

## I. Connections and Communications with Iran

How do you communicate with your family and friends in Iran?  
(Select all that apply.)

Mode of Communication	2017	2019	2020	2023	2025
Write letters	5%	12%	16%	7%	—
Send emails	23%	41%	31%	30%	9%
Voice telephone calls	66%	74%	50%	40%	32%
Video calls (Skype, FaceTime)	42%	66%	52%	56%	38%
Apps (Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal)	43%	69%	60%	76%	67%
Social media/networks ( Facebook, Instagram)	42%	57%	48%	51%	36%
Other	2%	<1%	2%	2%	—

Communication modes continue to evolve rapidly toward app-based and digital platforms, though 2025 shows a modest retrenchment in overall usage rates. Mobile messaging apps (67%) remain the dominant means of staying in touch, followed by video calls (38%) and traditional voice calls (32%), which have declined steadily since 2017. Use of social media as a communication tool also fell to 36%, while email usage dropped sharply to 9%, indicating a near-complete generational shift away from text-based correspondence toward encrypted, mobile-first applications.

How has the Iranian government’s recent barriers to the Internet, such as slowing speeds, barring the use of some apps, and shutting down Internet access for periods of time impacted your ability to communicate with family and friends in Iran?

Response Option	Percent
Very Negatively	40%
Somewhat Negatively	33%
Very Little Impact	19%
No Impact at All	8%
Total	100%

Nearly three-quarters (73%) of Iranian Americans who communicate with family in Iran report that government-imposed internet restrictions have negatively affected their ability to stay in touch, including 40% who say the impact has been very negative. The effects are most pronounced among younger respondents (49% of ages 18–34)—who are most reliant on digital communication platforms—and older respondents (47% of ages 65+), who depend heavily on online channels for contact with relatives abroad.

# Analysis

## I. Connections and Communications with Iran

Which of the following best describes your experience with family from Iran attempting to visit the United States during the past ten years? Asked of respondents who have family in Iran

Response Option	2024	2025
My family members have easily secured the necessary visas to enter the country.	28%	15%
My family members have visited, but it was a significant challenge to secure the necessary visas to enter the country.	41%	16%
My family members wanted to visit but were unable to secure the necessary visas to enter the country.	21%	43%
My family members are not interested in visiting or have never attempted to visit.	10%	26%
Total	100%	100%

Experiences securing U.S. visas for family members from Iran have deteriorated sharply from 2024 to 2025. The proportion of Iranian Americans reporting that relatives were unable to secure visas has more than doubled—from 21% to 43%—while those saying visas were obtained easily dropped from 28% to just 15%. Likewise, the share who say their family members eventually visited despite challenges fell from 41% to 16%, pointing to widespread frustration with current visa system and potential impact of the Travel Ban implemented earlier this year. Among 2025 respondents, older individuals are most likely to report visa denials (65+, 53%), while younger respondents more often say family members have not tried to visit at all (18–34, 33%).

During the past ten years, how often have you traveled to Iran?

Response Option	Percent
Once a Year or More	4%
Once Every 2 to 3 Years	13%
I Rarely Travel to Iran	30%
I've Never Been Back to Iran Since I Left	22%
I've Never Been to Iran	30%
Total	100%

A majority of Iranian Americans report limited or no travel to Iran in the past decade, with 52% saying they have either never been back (22%) or have never been to Iran at all (30%), with Baha'i respondents (49%), a small but distinct subgroup, being the least likely group to have returned. Only a small share of respondents—17% combined—travel once a year or every few years. Age and generational differences are striking: younger respondents (18–34) are the least likely to have visited, with over half (51%) saying they've never been, compared to just 17% among those 65 and older.

# Analysis

## I. Connections and Communications with Iran

How much do State Department Travel Warnings influence your decisions on travel to Iran?

Response Option	Percent
Significant Influence	34%
Some Influence	23%
Little Influence	15%
No Influence	28%
Total	100%

Most Iranian Americans report that U.S. State Department travel warnings factor into their decisions about visiting Iran, with 57% saying such advisories have at least some influence—including 34% who describe their effect as significant. Influence is strongest among older respondents (50+, 40%), women (39%), and Democrats (35%), while men (29%) and younger adults (18–34, 24%) are less deterred.

Higher-income (66%) and college-educated (62%) respondents also tend to weigh these warnings more seriously. Conversely, about one in four (28%) say travel advisories have no influence, a sentiment most common among younger (47%), male (52%), and Independent (45%) respondents. The results highlight how perceived travel risk is mediated by age, gender, and political outlook—underscoring how policy messaging around safety directly affects diaspora engagement and travel behavior.

# Analysis

## II. Iranian American Experience

Have you, or an Iranian American who is close to you, personally experienced discrimination in the past because of your ethnicity or country of origin?

Response Option	2016	2019	2020	2023	2024	2025
Yes	48%	63%	60%	55%	68%	53%
No	49%	33%	36%	42%	30%	31%
Not Sure	3%	4%	4%	3%	2%	16%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In 2025, 53% of Iranian Americans report that they or someone close to them have experienced discrimination because of their ethnicity or country of origin—down from the 2024 peak of 68%, but roughly in line with 2023 results and still indicating that a majority continue to face bias. The share saying “Not Sure” rose sharply to 16% (from 2% in 2024), suggesting increased uncertainty about what constitutes discrimination or a shift toward less overt, more systemic forms of bias.

Subgroup differences are pronounced. Women (57%) are more likely than men (48%) to report discrimination, and younger respondents under 50 (61%) report higher exposure than those 50 and older (43%). By political affiliation, Democrats (61%) are most likely to report discrimination, followed by Independents (55%) and Republicans (40%). Muslims (59%) and Baha’is (63%)—a small but distinct subgroup—report the highest incidence by religion, while those with postgraduate education and urban residents also report elevated levels.

Over the past decade of PAAIA surveys, reports of discrimination have shown a long-term upward trend despite periodic fluctuations tied to shifts in U.S.–Iran relations and domestic social climates. The share reporting discrimination climbed from 43% in 2015 to a record 68% in 2024, before the modest decline in 2025. While the latest decrease may suggest fewer overt incidents, the data overall reveal a persistent and entrenched pattern of perceived discrimination, with roughly half or more of Iranian Americans consistently reporting such experiences since 2019.

### In which of the following ways have you or another Iranian American you know experienced discrimination?

Type of Discrimination Experienced	Percent
Employment or Business Discrimination	35%
Social Discrimination	77%
Federal or Local Law Enforcement	28%
Immigration Officials	29%
Airlines or Airport Security	54%
Total Respondents	100%

Among Iranian Americans who report experiencing discrimination, social discrimination (77%) and encounters with airlines or airport security (54%) are the most cited, followed by employment or business-related discrimination (35%), and issues involving immigration (29%) or law enforcement (28%). Younger and middle-aged respondents (<50) are more likely to report discrimination in nearly every domain—particularly social (81%) and travel-related (62%)—while older respondents (50+) report more workplace discrimination (44%). Religious differences are pronounced: Zoroastrians (92%) and Baha’is (100%)—both small but distinct subgroups—report the highest rates of social discrimination, followed by Agnostics (86%), Christians (73%), Muslims (72%), Atheists (67%), and Jews (61%). Agnostics (71%) also encounter elevated bias in airport and security settings. Gender differences are minor: men are slightly more likely to report workplace or law-enforcement issues, women somewhat more likely to cite immigration or travel bias. Overall, 2025 results show that discrimination towards Iranian Americans remains pervasive.

# Analysis

## II. Iranian American Experience

When you travel internationally, which of the following best describes your feelings?

Response Option	Percent
I feel secure because of tight security at airports.	53%
I feel concerned about the potential discrimination and civil rights violations by TSA and customs agents.	36%
I do not travel internationally because of my concerns about discrimination and civil rights violations.	3%
I do not travel internationally for other reasons.	8%
Total	100%

In 2025, most Iranian Americans (53%) say they feel secure when traveling internationally due to airport security, while over a third (36%) express concern about discrimination or civil rights violations. Only small shares avoid international travel entirely because of discrimination (3%) or other reasons (8%). Demographic differences are clear. Women (40%) express more concern about discrimination than men (31%), and younger respondents (under 50, 38%) are more apprehensive than older ones (32%). Republicans (79%) overwhelmingly feel secure, compared with Democrats (41%) and Independents (47%), who are far more likely to report concerns. Religiously, Muslims remain the group most likely to worry about discrimination (51%), while Baha'is (11%), Jews (29%), Christians (31%), Zoroastrians (35%), Agnostics (38%), and Atheists (43%) report concerns at lower levels.

In 2019, 76% of Iranian Americans opposed the travel ban established during the first Trump Administration, while 16% supported the measure and 8% were not sure.

**Do you support or oppose the travel ban established by President Trump's executive order limiting travel from 12 countries, including Iran, to the United States?**

Response Option	Percent
Support	27%
Oppose	55%
Not Sure	18%
Total	100%

A majority of Iranian Americans (55%) oppose the travel ban targeting 12 countries, including Iran, while 27% support it and 18% are not sure. Opposition crosses most demographics but is sharply divided along partisan, gender, and religious lines. Republicans overwhelmingly support (68%) the travel ban, while Democrats (80%) and Independents (62%) overwhelmingly oppose it. Women (60%) and younger adults (under 50, 59%) are also more likely to oppose, compared with men (51%) and older respondents (50+, 31%), who show slightly more support. By religion, opposition is strongest among Muslims (68%), Atheists (72%), and Agnostics (79%), while the majority of Christian (55%) and Jewish respondents (53%) support the policy.

In 2019, 76% of Iranian Americans opposed the travel ban established during the first Trump Administration while 16% supported the measure and 8% were not sure.

# Analysis

## II. Iranian American Experience

Would you support or oppose a more limited travel ban targeting Iranian regime officials and their family members but allowing exemptions for ordinary Iranians to study, work, and/or visit family members in the United States?

Response Option	Percent
Support	67%
Oppose	19%
Not Sure	15%
Total	100%

Nearly two-thirds (67%) of Iranian Americans support a narrowly targeted travel ban focused only on Iranian regime officials and their families, while 19% oppose it and 15% are unsure. Support is broad and crosses most demographic groups. Men (69%) express slightly stronger support than women (64%). Support also rises with age (61% <50 vs. 73% >50+). Politically, Republicans show the strongest support (80%), but majorities of Democrats (67%) and Independents (61%) also favor the measure. The findings underscore a broad consensus that restrictions should focus on regime officials and their family members while preserving entry opportunities for ordinary Iranians to study, work, or visit family in the United States.

# Analysis

## II. Iranian American Experience

The Temporary Family Visitation Act (TFVA) would make it easier for citizens of Iran and other countries to visit relatives in the United States. Many tourist visas are denied today because of concerns that visitors might immigrate or overstay. Under this proposal, U.S. family members could request a 90-day “family-visit” visa after demonstrating financial support and travel-medical insurance coverage for their relatives. Would you support or oppose this legislation?

Response Option	2023	2024	2025
Strongly support	57%	50%	46%
Somewhat support	35%	34%	29%
Total Support	92%	83%	75%
Somewhat oppose	4%	12%	6%
Strongly oppose	3%	5%	7%
Total Oppose	8%	17%	13%
Not sure	–	–	12%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Support for the Temporary Family Visitation Act remains broad and bipartisan, though it has eased slightly from prior years. In 2025, three-quarters (75%) of Iranian Americans support the proposal, including 46% who strongly support it, while 13% oppose and 12% are unsure.

The question’s wording in 2025 National Survey was more detailed in describing the legislation whereas the 2023–2024 Surveys’ framed TFVA more generally to help foreign nationals visit U.S. relatives. That shift in framing may account for some of the decline in overall and “strong” support compared with previous years, which showed extraordinarily high backing (92% in 2023 and 83% in 2024).

By age, support ranges from 70% (35–49 years old) to 79% (<35 years old), showing only modest variation. Across party lines, backing remains overwhelming - 80% among Republicans, 74% among Democrats, and 74% among Independents - demonstrating the proposal’s bipartisan appeal.

Subgroup patterns are consistent with earlier years. Overall, the TFVA continues to command overwhelming goodwill within the Iranian American community, reflecting a strong desire for family-based mobility and legal pathways for temporary visits.

# Analysis

## III. U.S.-Iran Relations

When it comes to U.S.-Iran relations, of the following list of issues which two are most important to you?

Response Option	2017	2018	2019	2020	2023	2025
Promotion of human rights & democracy in Iran	63	74	54	58	51	41
Promoting regime change in Iran	28	37	25	25	41	44
Lifting U.S. sanctions against Iran*	50	44	38	29	31	22
Preventing conflict / broader regional war with Iran**	—	—	27	23	13	21
Limiting Iran's role in supporting terrorist organizations or foreign military involvement	15	14	21	21	22	19
Successful negotiation of a new nuclear agreement (U.S.-Iran)†	21	15	20	27	18	16
Tightening sanctions against the Iranian government***	8	7	8	14	17	14

\* 2025 broadens “Lifting U.S. sanctions...” vs. 2023’s “Lifting the U.S. trade embargo with the hope of supporting economic growth in Iran.”

\*\* 2025 broadens “Preventing a U.S. military strike” (2023) to “Preventing conflict or a broader regional war.”

\*\*\* 2025 separates “Tightening sanctions...”; 2023 combined “Keeping sanctions in place or tightening sanctions.”

† The nuclear-agreement wording has varied slightly across years.

The top two issues for Iranian Americans with respect to U.S.-Iran relations remain “promoting regime change” (44%) and the “promotion of human rights and democracy in Iran” (41%). These were also the leading priorities in 2023, with only a slight uptick for regime change - well within the margin of error - but a notable softening on human rights and democracy, down ten points from the previous survey.

Two middle-tier issues have shifted relative momentum: “preventing conflict or a broader regional war” rebounds to 21% (back near 2019–2020 levels), while “lifting sanctions” declines to 22%, well below its 2017–2018 highs.

Partisan divides in 2025 are stark. Republicans strongly emphasize regime change (62%) and tightening sanctions (27%), whereas Democrats prioritize human rights and democracy (50%) and are more likely to support lifting sanctions (26%). Independents split the difference—40% for regime change, 41% for human rights, and 29% for lifting sanctions. Concern about preventing conflict runs highest among Democrats (28%), nearly triple the share among Republicans (10%).

Age further distinguishes viewpoints. Older respondents (50+) are more inclined toward regime change (52%) and tightening sanctions (21%), while younger Iranian Americans (18–49) lean toward lifting sanctions (26%) and preventing conflict (27%), suggesting a generational divide between more assertive and more conciliatory approaches. Support for human rights and democracy is relatively even by age (43% among <50 vs. 41% among 50+).

# Analysis

## III. U.S.-Iran Relations

Looking at the future of potential deal-making between the United States and Iran, there are three distinct options. Which of the three would you prefer?

Response Option	Percent
Returning to a limited nuclear deal with Iran (similar to the 2015 JCPOA)	17%
Making a new, more comprehensive deal addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, regional engagement, support for armed non-state actors, and human-rights violations	38%
No deal	32%
Not sure	14%
Total	100%

The 2025 results show no clear consensus among Iranian Americans on the future of U.S.–Iran negotiations. A plurality (38%) favors a new, more comprehensive deal, one that goes beyond nuclear restrictions to address Iran’s regional activities, support for non-state actors, and human rights violations. About one in three (32%) now prefer no deal, while only 17% support a return to the 2015-style JCPOA, and 14% remain unsure.

The 2025 findings reflect continued erosion of support for a return to the JCPOA (down from 29% in 2020 and 15% in 2023 to just 17% today) and a steady narrowing of enthusiasm for a comprehensive deal (from 47% in 2020 and 41% in 2023 to 38%). By contrast, support for “no deal” remains at roughly one-third, sustaining the sharp jump observed between 2020 (24%) and 2023 (38%). While question wording complicates direct comparisons, the trend suggests declining faith in limited nuclear-only agreements and enduring skepticism about Iran’s behavior.

Partisan differences are striking in 2025. Democrats overwhelmingly favor a comprehensive deal (53%) and are least likely to reject negotiations (17%), whereas Republicans are divided between “no deal” (55%) and a small minority backing a comprehensive deal (26%). Independents split between a comprehensive deal (34%) and no deal (30%). Notably, few in any political group favor returning to a limited nuclear deal like the JCPOA, underscoring how little confidence remains in that framework.

# Analysis

## III. U.S.-Iran Relations

In your opinion, which of the following is the most important thing the U.S. government should be doing (if anything) to support the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran?

Response Option	Percent
Recognize and advocate for human rights defenders and political prisoners in Iran	22%
Expand and offer visas to Iranians fleeing persecution in Iran	16%
Expand funding and remove legal barriers to support internet access in Iran	13%
Impose and tighten sanctions on human rights violators	13%
Establish a fund for nonviolent strikers and those working for a transition to democracy in Iran	9%
Expand funding for Persian-language broadcasts	4%
The U.S. government should not get involved with the protest movement in Iran	15%
Not sure	9%
Total	100%

When asked what the U.S. government should do to support Iran’s Woman, Life, Freedom movement, recognizing and advocating for human rights defenders and political prisoners emerges as the top choice (22%). The next tier of preferred measures includes expanding and offering visas to Iranians fleeing persecution (16%) and expanding funding and removing legal barriers to improve internet access (13%) - reflecting support for humanitarian and connectivity-driven engagement.

Roughly one-quarter of respondents favor more coercive or institutional tools: 13% call for imposing and tightening sanctions on human-rights violators, and 9% favor establishing a fund for nonviolent strikers and pro-democracy workers inside Iran. Only 15% say the U.S. should not get involved in the protest movement.

By party affiliation, Democrats (22%) and Independents (25%) are most likely to prioritize advocacy for human rights defenders, while Republicans show somewhat higher preference for imposing sanctions (17%) and lower for visa expansion (11%). By religious affiliation, support for human rights advocacy is more pronounced among the Baha’i (30%), a small but distinct subgroup, the Atheist (24%), and the Jewish (23%) communities compared to the overall result.

Overall, the results depict a community that favors moral and humanitarian support over direct interference or broad punitive measures. The findings seem to underscore a continued desire for policies that empower Iranian civil society without escalating conflict.

# Analysis

## III. U.S.-Iran Relations

Do you agree or disagree with the June 2025 U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities?

Response	Percent
Strongly agree	34%
Somewhat agree	11%
Somewhat disagree	11%
Strongly disagree	33%
Not sure	11%
Total	100%

Iranian Americans are divided over the June 2025 U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Roughly 45% express agreement (34% strongly, 11% somewhat), while an almost identical 44% disagree (33% strongly, 11% somewhat). Only about one in ten are uncertain. The near-even split could highlight both continuing distrust of the Iranian regime and anxiety about escalation following direct military action.

Partisan and demographic crosstabs show clear polarization. Republicans overwhelmingly approve of the strikes with about two-thirds (66%) strongly agreeing. Whereas Democrats overwhelmingly oppose them, with nearly half (48%) strongly disagreeing. Independents are more evenly split, with 33% in strong agreement and 39% in strong disagreement. Older respondents (50+) show support (54%), while younger Iranian Americans (18-49) lean against (51%).

Religious patterns mirror those political cleavages. Zoroastrian (52%), Christian (63%), Jewish (83%), and Baha’i—a small but distinct subgroup (92%)—respondents show relatively high levels of approval for strikes on the nuclear facilities, while Agnostic (65%), Muslim (60%), and Atheist (50%) respondents disagree.

Overall, these findings illustrate a community torn between supporting action against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and opposing military confrontation. The pattern reinforces broader survey themes: strong concern about Iran’s regime and security behavior, tempered by a persistent reluctance to see another war.

# Analysis

## III. U.S.-Iran Relations

Which of these best explains your opposition to the U.S. airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities?  
(Asked only of respondents who disagreed with the airstrikes)

Response Option	Percent
Concern about civilian casualties	56%
Concern about Iranian retaliation against America or U.S. interests in the region	13%
Concern that it could lead to a wider war involving U.S. ground troops	26%
Concern that it could lead to Americans being taken hostage by Iran	0%
Not sure	5%
Total	100%

Among the Iranian Americans who oppose the June 2025 airstrikes, the predominant concern is civilian harm. A majority (56%) cite fear of civilian casualties as their main reason for opposition, emphasizing enduring sensitivity toward the humanitarian toll of military action inside Iran. This perspective is likely reinforced by the strong personal ties many respondents maintain to family members still living in Iran, making potential civilian casualties not an abstract concern but a deeply personal one.

Roughly one-quarter of opponents (26%) worry that the strikes could escalate into a broader regional war involving U.S. ground troops, underscoring apprehension about another Middle-East conflict. A smaller share (13%) point to the risk of Iranian retaliation against American interests, suggesting that fewer respondents frame their opposition in terms of U.S. security exposure than in humanitarian or anti-war terms. None selected the possibility of Americans being taken hostage, and 5% remain unsure.

Taken together, these results show that humanitarian and anti-war considerations overwhelmingly outweigh fears of direct retaliation or hostage scenarios among opponents of the strikes—reinforcing a broader pattern of caution about actions that could endanger civilians.

# Analysis

## IV. Iran's Government

What type of government do you think would work best in Iran?

Type of Government	2017	2018	2023	2025
Islamic Republic	1	<1	7	3
Reformed Islamic Republic	8	5	12	6
Parliamentary Democracy / Republic*	55	68	60	55
Constitutional Monarchy	11	14	12	17
None of the Above	16	5	7	5
Not Sure	9	7	3	14
Total	100	100	100	100

\*Prior to 2018, this option was labeled "Secular Democracy."

A parliamentary democracy or republic continues to be the preferred form of government for Iran, supported by 55% of respondents in 2025, consistent with past surveys, though slightly lower than 2023 (60%). Support for a constitutional monarchy has risen to 17%, its highest level since 2018, while backing for a reformed Islamic republic (6%) and for the current Islamic Republic (3%) remain low.

Uncertainty has increased, with 14% not sure, up from just 3% in 2023. This may indicate greater ambivalence or caution about Iran's political direction following recent unrest and international tensions. Overall, the 2025 results reaffirm that Iranian Americans continue to favor a democratic, representative form of government for Iran over religious or autocratic models.

# Methodology

SurveyUSA interviewed 425 Iranian Americans across the entire United States from October 7 to October 24, 2025 using a blended sample, mixed-mode approach. 19% of adults were interviewed on the display of their smartphone, tablet, or other electronic device using a non-probability sample of internet panel members provided by Cint USA. Panel members were pre-screened by Cint as being of Middle Eastern descent, and were further screened by SurveyUSA for being of Persian or Iranian descent before being allowed into the survey. Eighty-one percent (81%) of adults were interviewed using probability-based telephone sample of pre-screened adults of Persian heritage from Aristotle of Washington, DC, with 78% called by live operators, who hand-dialed respondents on their mobile telephone, secured their cooperation, and texted them a link to an online survey, and 3% interviewed by live operators who hand-dialed telephone numbers, secured respondent cooperation, and stayed on the line to conduct the entire interview by voice.

The pool of adult respondents was weighted to US Census-derived targets for gender, age, and education level. The margin of sampling error for this survey is calculated per question, and reported as a “credibility interval,” which is a more conservative measure of total survey error than traditional margins of error. Credibility intervals, like traditional margins of sampling error, attempt to show how far in either direction a set of numbers might slide, if every other part of the research had been undertaken completely perfectly. And, just like traditional margin of error calculations, they vary from question to question based on both the number of respondents and on how the respondents “split” in their answers.

Unlike traditional calculations, credibility intervals also incorporate additional sources of total survey error into their calculations, including the impact of weighting on the poll results. As a result, they are a more conservative measure of error, typically somewhat larger than traditional margins of sampling error would be. Credibility intervals on the substantive questions on this project range from a low of  $\pm 3.4$  percentage points to a high of  $\pm 7.3$  percentage points, with the median credibility interval across the survey being  $\pm 5.2$  percentage points.

# Demographic Breakdown

Male	52%
Female	48%
18-34	24%
35-49	32%
50-64	26%
65+	18%
Republican	24%
Democrat	35%
Independent	34%
Married	56%
Live With Partner	8%
Divorced	13%
Widowed	2%
Never Married	21%

Muslim	24%
Baha'i	1%
Zoroastrian	5%
Christian	12%
Agnostic	16%
Atheist	17%
Jewish	11%
Other	15%
< \$40K	21%
\$40K - \$80K	43%
> \$80K	36%

No Degree	21%
4-year Degree	34%
Post-Graduate	45%
Last 25 Years	19%
1990s	13%
1981-89	20%
1978-80	19%
Pre-1978	28%
Own	76%
Rent	24%
Urban	41%
Suburban	53%
Rural	5%
Northeast	11%
Midwest	9%
South	20%
West	60%



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