



PAAIA

Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans

NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

2015

IRANIAN AMERICANS & AMERICAN PUBLIC

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Executive Summary

As we approach the deadline for the completion of a P5+1 agreement with Iran over the disposition of Iran's nuclear program, The Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA) commissioned Zogby Research Services (ZRS) to examine the attitudes of both Iranian Americans and the American public at large toward a number of issues related to the nuclear pact, U.S.-Iranian relations, and the status and role of Iranian Americans.

From May 20 to May 31, 2015, we polled 400 Iranian Americans and, from May 30 to May 31, 2015, we surveyed 1,010 American adults.

What we found was an Iranian American community that has retained strong ties to close family members in Iran. As a result they are supportive of efforts to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran and hopeful that in the wake of such an agreement life will improve for their family and friends in Iran, who they say have been hurt by the U.S. sanctions on Iran.

At the same time, despite continuing discrimination, Iranian Americans appear to feel more comfortable with their future in the United States. They say that two of their top priorities are to enhance their image in the United States and to improve American understanding of their culture.

For their part, American voters at large, while supportive of a nuclear agreement with Iran and displaying favorable attitudes toward Iranian Americans, in surprisingly large numbers indicate that they are unsure or uninformed about a number of key issues involving U.S.-Iranian relations.

A summary of our key findings follows:

1. Most Iranian Americans (more than eight in 10) have close family still in Iran, with one-third having parents in Iran and more than one-half having siblings there.
2. While most Iranian Americans do not travel to Iran to visit family, they do remain in close contact, with six in 10 reporting that they communicate with family and friends in Iran at least several times each month.
3. While the preferred form of communication between Iranian Americans and friends and family in Iran is by phone, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of various mobile communication apps and forms of social media. Iranian Americans, however, do report encountering a number of problems in communicating with Iran; chief among them are poor Internet and phone service in Iran, followed by security concerns and internet censorship.
4. More than two-thirds report that economic sanctions imposed on Iran have had a significant impact on their family and friends in Iran. In this context, almost seven in 10 Iranian Americans are supportive of the exemptions the U.S. government has made for remittances to family and supplies of food and medicine, and a majority would favor expanding exemptions. Three-quarters favor facilitating the transfers of remittances to family in Iran.
5. Two-thirds of Iranian Americans are in favor of the P5+1 agreement to place limits on Iran's nuclear program, but a plurality believe that the agreement should be subject to congressional approval. Nevertheless, eight in 10 say that President Obama has been effective in handling nego-

tiations with Iran.

6. Iranian Americans also believe that should a nuclear agreement be reached, it will have a positive impact on the Iranian people, improving their economic opportunities and advancing political reform within Iran. And while eight in 10 believe that a successful agreement will improve Iran's relations with the West, only six in 10 believe that it will improve Iran's relations with its regional neighbors.
7. Should no deal be reached by the June 30th deadline, two-thirds of Iranian Americans support continuing negotiations. Less than one in 10 would support any military action against Iran.
8. On the domestic front, Iranian Americans appear to feel increasingly secure in the United States. While four in 10 report either having been discriminated against or knowing someone who has been a victim of discrimination because they are Iranian, fewer respondents say they fear that discrimination will increase in the future or worry about government surveillance.
9. Among the issues affecting their community, the top two priorities for Iranian Americans are improving Americans' understanding of Iranian culture and ensuring that the image of Iranian Americans is accurately portrayed. These are followed by improving understanding between the peoples of the United States and Iran and working to lift the trade embargo to support commercial ties between the United States and Iran.
10. There are no surprises in the survey of American public opinion, except for the significant number of respondents (about one-third across the board) who say they are "not sure" or "not familiar enough with the issue" to have an opinion. Nevertheless, by a margin of two to one, Americans have a favorable view of Iranian Americans and a slight plurality have a positive view of the Iranian people. On the other hand, by a six to one margin Americans have an unfavorable view of the Iranian government.
11. By a two to one margin, Americans support the P5+1 framework agreement with Iran, while a slight majority support congressional approval and oversight of any negotiated deal. In both cases, more than one-third have no opinion because they are not sure or are unfamiliar with the issue.
12. With regard to existing exemptions to U.S. sanctions on Iran that allow for family remittances or shipments of food and medicine, almost four in 10 Americans say that these exemptions should be kept the same, while near equal numbers (about one in seven) say they should either be expanded or stopped. Three in 10 are not sure.

Report of Findings

I. Connections and Communications with Iran

| Do you have family in Iran? | | |
|-----------------------------|------|------|
| | 2015 | 2012 |
| Yes | 84 | 84 |
| No | 15 | 16 |
| Not sure | 1 | - |

In both the 2012 and 2015 surveys, when we ask respondents if they have family in Iran, 84% say they do.

| Which of the following best describes the family or friends you have in Iran? (Choose all that apply) | |
|---|------|
| | 2015 |
| A parent | 36 |
| Spouse | 4 |
| Children | 4 |
| Brother or sister | 59 |
| Grandparents | 16 |
| Cousins, aunts or uncles | 85 |
| Other relatives | 68 |
| Close friends | 58 |

Of those who have family in Iran, a majority report having an immediate family member there (brother or sister: 59%, parent: 36%, spouse: 4%, children: 4%). When considering extended family like cousins, aunts or uncles, 85% of those with any family in the country report having such relations in Iran. Two-thirds (68%) have other relatives, 58% have close friends, and 16% have grandparents in Iran.

| How frequently do you communicate with your family or friends in Iran? | | | |
|--|------|------|------|
| | 2015 | 2011 | 2009 |
| Daily | 7 | 5 | 6 |
| Several times per week | 21 | 24 | 23 |
| Several times per month | 32 | 33 | 39 |
| Several times per year | 19 | 22 | 21 |
| Rarely | 16 | 15 | 10 |
| Never | 5 | 2 | 1 |

Communication between Iranian Americans and their family and friends in Iran is frequent, with numbers that match those in the 2011 and 2009 surveys. More than one-quarter (28%) are in contact at least several times per week, including 7% who are in contact daily. One-third (32%) communicate several

times per month, and 19% say they are in contact several times each year. Sixteen percent (16%) say they rarely communicate with family and friends in Iran, and only 5% say they never do.

| How do you communicate with your family or friends in Iran? (Choose all that apply) | | | |
|--|------|------|------|
| | 2015 | 2011 | 2009 |
| I write letters | 2 | 4 | 7 |
| I send emails | 44 | 32 | 40 |
| I call them | 89 | 72 | 88 |
| Internet telephone and video chat services, such as Skype and Google Hangout | 49 | 9 | 4 |
| Mobile communication applications, such as Viber, Whatsapp, WeChat, etc. | 52 | N/A | N/A |
| Social media and social networks, such as Facebook, Google Plus, Twitter, etc. | 51 | 25 | 14 |
| Other (specify) | 1 | -- | -- |

When asked about the modes of communication they use to contact family and friends in Iran, Iranian American respondents most frequently say they use a phone (89%). About half of all respondents say they use mobile communication applications like Viber and Whatsapp (52%), social media like Facebook and Twitter (51%), and Internet phone and video chat services like Skype (49%). Email is also mentioned by a significant percentage of respondents (44%).

In comparing these results to the 2011 and 2009 surveys, most notable is the dramatic rise in usage of mobile communication apps, which were not even included in the previous surveys, Internet phone and video chat (from 4% in 2009 to 49% in 2015), and social media (from 14% to 51%).

| What types of problems, if any, have you encountered when you communicate with family or friends in Iran? (Choose all that apply) | |
|--|------|
| | 2015 |
| Poor Internet service in Iran | 49 |
| Poor phone service in Iran | 39 |
| Security concerns | 29 |
| Internet censorship and restrictions on access to websites in the country | 32 |
| Cost of international communications | 26 |
| I have not experienced any problems. | 27 |
| Other (specify) | 2 |

While one-quarter of respondents (27%) say they have not experienced any problems with trying to communicate with family and friends in Iran, almost half (49%) say they have had problems because of poor Internet service in Iran. Poor phone service in Iran (39%), Internet censorship and restrictions on access to particular websites in the country (32%), and security concerns (29%) are also significant problems for communication according to Iranian Americans. About one-quarter (26%) also cite the cost of international communications as a problem.

| How significant have the economic sanctions imposed on Iran been for your family and friends in Iran? | |
|---|-----------|
| | 2015 |
| Very significant | 35 |
| Somewhat significant | 34 |
| Significant | 68 |
| Somewhat not significant | 7 |
| Not at all significant | 14 |
| Not significant | 21 |
| Not sure | 11 |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

More than two-thirds of respondents (68%) say the economic sanctions imposed on Iran have been significant for their family and friends in Iran. About one in five (21%) say the sanctions have not been significant for their families and friends. The remaining 11% are not sure of the impact of the sanctions.

| How often do you travel to Iran? | 2015 | 2011 | 2009 |
|---|------|------|------|
| Once a year or more often | 9 | 9 | 11 |
| Once every 2 or 3 years | 29 | 23 | 30 |
| I rarely travel to Iran | 25 | 29 | 34 |
| I've never been back to Iran since I left | 25 | 30 | N/A |
| I've never been to Iran | 12 | 8 | 24 |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Travel to Iran by survey respondents is generally infrequent, with just 9% saying they travel to Iran at least once a year and 29% saying they go once every two or three years. One-quarter rarely travel to Iran, an additional one-quarter have not been back to Iran since their original departure, and 12% have never been to Iran. These responses closely track those of respondents in the 2011 survey, as well as some of the response rates from 2009. It is worthy of note that the options in 2009 did not include *I've never been back to Iran since I left*, which may account for the higher percentages of those who say they *rarely travel to Iran* and *have never been to Iran*.

II. Iranian American Experience

| Have you or another Iranian American you know personally experienced discrimination in the past because of your or their ethnicity or country of origin? | | |
|---|------|------|
| | 2015 | 2012 |
| Yes | 43 | 40 |
| No | 54 | 58 |
| Not sure | 3 | 3 |
| <i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i> | | |

While a majority of respondents (54%) have not experienced discrimination, a sizable percentage (43%) say that they or another Iranian American that they know have personally experienced discrimination in the past because of their ethnicity or country of origin. These numbers closely track the results of the 2012 survey when we asked the same question.

| Are you concerned that there may be increased discrimination against Iranian Americans in the future? | | | |
|---|------|-------|-------|
| | 2015 | 2013* | 2012* |
| Yes | 39 | 49 | 55 |
| No | 53 | 42 | 39 |
| Not sure | 9 | 10 | 7 |
| <i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i> | | | |
| <i>* In 2012 and 2013 we asked: Are you concerned that U.S. hostilities with Iran have the potential for increasing discrimination against Iranian Americans?</i> | | | |

There is a notable decrease, however, in the concern of respondents about increased discrimination against Iranian Americans in the future. In 2012 and 2013, about half of the respondents were concerned about this possibility (2013: 49% and 2012: 55%), while in our recent survey 39% express this concern and 53% say they are not concerned about increased discrimination. (It is worth noting, however, that the wording of the question is slightly different in the most recent survey and that may explain the difference.)

| Are you concerned with Iranian Americans being targeted for surveillance or increased scrutiny by U.S. law enforcement agencies? | | |
|--|------|-------|
| | 2015 | 2012* |
| Yes | 30 | 55 |
| No | 61 | 34 |
| Not sure | 9 | 11 |
| <i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i> | | |
| <i>* In 2012 we asked: Are you concerned that U.S. hostilities with Iran could result in Iranian Americans being targeted for surveillance or increased scrutiny by U.S. law enforcement agencies?</i> | | |

With respect to Iranian Americans being targeted for surveillance or increased scrutiny by U.S. law enforcement agencies, 30% of the respondents are concerned about this possibility while 61% are not concerned. An additional 9% are not sure. Again, there is a drop in concern since 2012; but again, the wording of the question may have influenced these responses.

Of the following list of issues affecting Iranian Americans, which two are most important to you personally? (Choose two)

| | 2015 |
|---|------|
| Ensuring that the image of Iranian Americans in the U.S. accurately reflects our values and our accomplishments | 31 |
| Facilitating greater understanding between the peoples of the U.S. and Iran | 26 |
| Making visa issuance to family and friends from Iran less difficult or burdensome | 19 |
| Assisting new immigrants from Iran get situated in the U.S. | 8 |
| Helping Iranian Americans get elected to political office and increasing the political influence of Iranian Americans in the U.S. | 17 |
| Lifting the U.S. trade embargo to support commercial ties with Iran | 25 |
| Improving understanding of Iranian culture in the U.S. | 33 |
| None of the above | 8 |
| Not sure | 17 |

Respondents were presented with a list of issues affecting Iranian Americans and asked to select the two that are most personally important to them. The top two issues to emerge are related to Americans' understanding of Iranian Americans and Iranian culture: improving understanding of Iranian culture in the United States (33%) and ensuring that the image of Iranian Americans in the United States accurately reflects their values and accomplishments (31%). The next two most important issues for Iranian American respondents are related to the relationship between the United States and Iran: facilitating greater understanding between the peoples of the U.S. and Iran (26%) and lifting the U.S. trade embargo to support commercial ties with Iran (25%). Improving the process of visa issuance for family and friends from Iran (19%) and helping Iranian Americans get elected to political office (17%) are slightly less important to respondents, as is assisting new immigrants from Iran get situated in the United States (8%).

Of the following list of issues affecting U.S.-Iran relations, which two do you believe should be the most important to Iranian Americans? (Choose two)

| | 2015 | 2011* | 2009* | 2008* |
|--|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Promotion of human rights and democracy in Iran | 55 | 63 | 72 | 70 |
| Promotion of economic growth in Iran | 24 | 21 | 23 | 32 |
| Successful completion of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran and the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran | 40 | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Limiting Iran's role in supporting terrorist organizations or foreign military involvement | 11 | 15 | 6 | 14 |
| Preventing a U.S. military strike against Iran | 17 | 14 | 14 | 31 |
| Promoting regime change in Iran | 23 | 30 | 33 | N/A |
| None of the above | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| Not sure | 15 | 9 | 2 | 2 |

* In 2008, 2009, and 2011, the following additional options were provided: "Ensuring Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes" and "Lifting U.S. restrictions on ability of individuals to send money to families and charities in Iran."

A majority of respondents (55%) say that the *promotion of human rights and democracy in Iran* should be one of the most important issues to Iranian Americans; it is worth noting, however, that this percentage has fallen steadily from its high of 72% in 2009. The *successful completion of the P5+1 negotiations and lifting of sanctions* is the second place finisher, with 40% of Iranian Americans saying it is one of the most important issues. This is a new option in the current survey, so no direct comparative data is available; however, this figure is significantly higher than the related option from previous surveys (*Ensuring Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes*—2008: 20%, 2009: 11%, 2011: 17%). About one-quarter of Iranian American respondents say *promotion of economic growth in Iran* (24%) and *promoting regime change* (23%) are important issues. While the *economic growth* option is somewhat stable compared to other recent surveys, *regime change* is significantly less important than in previous surveys (from 33% in 2009 to 23% in 2015). *Preventing a U.S. military strike against Iran* and *limiting Iran's role in supporting terrorism* are the least important issues, as they have been in previous surveys.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans to select *successful completion of the P5+1 negotiations* (D: 46% vs. R: 20%) and *promoting economic growth in Iran* (D: 25% vs. R: 12%), while Republicans are twice as likely to select *regime change* (R: 35% vs. D: 18%) and *preventing a U.S. military strike in Iran* (R: 33% vs. D: 16%).

III. U.S.-Iran Relations

| Over the years, the U.S. government has allowed for certain exemptions to the U.S. trade embargo with Iran allowing for transactions associated with family remittances, food, medicine, and personal communications tools. Do you favor or oppose this? | |
|---|------|
| | 2015 |
| Favor | 72 |
| Oppose | 20 |
| Not sure | 8 |

Respondents are decidedly in favor of the U.S. government allowing certain exemptions to the U.S. trade embargo with Iran including family remittances, food, medicine, and personal communication tools. Seventy-two percent (72%) say they are in favor, while 20% are opposed to these exemptions.

| Some U.S. companies have managed to establish limited business relations with Iran to sell permissible products to Iran. Should trade exemptions with Iran be ... | |
|--|------|
| | 2015 |
| Expanded | 57 |
| Kept the same | 11 |
| Stopped | 21 |
| Not sure | 12 |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Similarly, when asked about exemptions that have allowed some U.S. companies to establish limited business relations with Iran to sell permissible products, 68% are in favor with 57% of respondents saying these trade exemptions should be expanded and 11% saying they should be kept the same. On the other hand, 21% say they should be stopped.

Democrats are more supportive of these exemptions than Republicans (i.e., 75% of Democrats think they should either be expanded or kept the same vs. 61% of Republicans); and Republicans are twice as likely to say they should be stopped as Democrats (35% vs. 17%).

| Would you support or oppose the establishment of a direct banking link between the U.S. and Iran to facilitate the transparent transfer of family remittances and other permissible transactions with Iran? | |
|--|-----------|
| | 2015 |
| Strongly support | 54 |
| Somewhat support | 23 |
| Support | 77 |
| Somewhat oppose | 4 |
| Strongly oppose | 13 |
| Oppose | 17 |
| Not sure | 6 |

We find similar levels of support and opposition for the establishment of a direct banking link between the United States and Iran to facilitate the transparent transfer of family remittances and other permissible transactions with Iran. In this case, 77% support such a direct banking link (with 54% saying they strongly support it), while 17% oppose it.

Again, we see Republicans a bit more suspect of this policy proposal, with 62% in favor and 33% opposed in comparison to 85% of Democrats in favor and 11% opposed.

| Would you support or oppose the establishment of a U.S. Interest Section in Tehran that would provide consular services and issue U.S. visas, but would not constitute the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran? | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 2015 | 2014 | 2011 | 2008* |
| Strongly support | 55 | 66 | 50 | -- |
| Somewhat support | 21 | 17 | 23 | -- |
| Support | 76 | 83 | 73 | 84 |
| Somewhat oppose | 5 | 3 | 4 | -- |
| Strongly oppose | 8 | 5 | 10 | -- |
| Oppose | 13 | 8 | 14 | 8 |
| Not sure | 11 | 9 | 14 | 8 |

*Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
* In 2008, respondents were only given the options "support," "oppose," and "not sure."*

More than three-quarters of respondents support the establishment of a U.S. Interest Section in Tehran that would provide consular services and issue U.S. visas, but would not constitute the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran. A majority (55%) strongly support this option. Thirteen percent of respondents oppose such a move. These responses are similar to the responses in previous surveys.

There is a considerably more opposition to this proposal from Republicans (30%) than from Democrats (10%) and Independents (12%).

IV. P5+1 Agreement with Iran

| Do you approve or disapprove of the P5+1 framework agreement with Iran designed to place limits on Iran's nuclear program? | | |
|--|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | Iranian Americans | Overall U.S. Opinion* |
| Strongly approve | 46 | 11 |
| Somewhat approve | 18 | 30 |
| Approve | 64 | 41 |
| Somewhat disapprove | 5 | 10 |
| Strongly disapprove | 15 | 13 |
| Disapprove | 20 | 23 |
| Not sure/Not enough information | 16 | 36 |

** American voters were asked: As you may know a framework agreement was reached in which the United States and other countries would lift nuclear related economic sanctions against Iran, in exchange for Iran agreeing to place limits on its nuclear program in a way that makes it harder for it to produce nuclear weapons. Do you support or oppose this agreement or don't you feel you have enough information to have an opinion?*

Almost two-thirds of Iranian American respondents (64%) approve of the P5+1 framework agreement with Iran designed to place limits on Iran's nuclear program, while 20% disapprove of the agreement. A significant number of respondents (16%) are not sure. Iranian American Democrats are more likely to support the agreement (74%-12%) than Iranian American Republicans (46%-38%).

Overall U.S. opinion leans toward approval for the P5+1 agreement with Iran, with 41% saying they support an agreement that lifts nuclear-related economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for Iran agreeing to limit its nuclear program and 23% saying they oppose it. More than one-third of these respondents, however, say they do not have enough information to have an opinion (36%). Again, party affiliation affects the level of support; support for the agreement among Democrats is stronger (52%) than it is among Republicans (29%) and Independents (40%).

| Would you support or oppose legislation that would make an Iran agreement subject to congressional approval and oversight? | | |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|
| | Iranian Americans | Overall U.S. Opinion |
| Strongly support | 29 | 22 |
| Somewhat support | 20 | 30 |
| Support | 49 | 52 |
| Somewhat oppose | 10 | 7 |
| Strongly oppose | 26 | 5 |
| Oppose | 36 | 13 |
| Not sure | 15 | 35 |

Just under half of Iranian American respondents (49%) support legislation that would make an Iran agreement subject to congressional approval and oversight; 36% oppose such legislation. Again, 15% are not

sure. Iranian American Republicans are more enthusiastic about congressional oversight (65%) than their Democratic counterparts (49%).

Support for congressional approval and oversight among all Americans (52%) is similar to that of Iranian Americans. Support for such oversight is again stronger among Republicans (66%), though pluralities of Democrats (50%) and Independents (40%) also support it. Older Americans are also more in favor of this legislation, with 70% of those age 65 and over voicing support in comparison to 43% of those 18-29. More than one-third of U.S. respondents are unsure of their position on this issue (35%).

| How do you rate President Obama's handling of the negotiations with Iran? | |
|--|-----------|
| | 2015 |
| Very effective | 43 |
| Somewhat effective | 36 |
| Effective | 79 |
| Somewhat ineffective | 4 |
| Very ineffective | 14 |
| Ineffective | 17 |
| Not sure | 3 |
| <i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i> | |

There is strong support among Iranian Americans for President Obama with respect to the negotiations with Iran. Almost eight in 10 (79%) say the president has been effective in these negotiations and just 17% say he has been ineffective. Not surprisingly, support by Iranian American Democrats is significantly higher than that of Republicans; 89% of Democrats say the president has been effective in the Iran negotiations, while just 49% of Republicans agree.

The level of support indicated in this survey represents an increase in support for the president as a potential deal gets closer to reality. The 2013 and 2014 surveys asked: *Do you support president's handling of Iran's nuclear program?* In 2013, 59% said yes, while 20% said no and 21% of respondents were not sure. In 2014, 52% said yes, 28% said no, and 20% were not sure.

| In the event that no deal can be completed by the June 30th deadline, what would be the best policy for the U.S. to pursue? | |
|--|------|
| | 2015 |
| Continue negotiations | 64 |
| International strategy of containment of Iran | 9 |
| Additional sanctions | 11 |
| A military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities | 7 |
| Not sure | 9 |

Iranian Americans are clear on the policy they think the United States should pursue if no deal can be completed by the June 30th deadline. Almost two-thirds (64%) think the United States should continue negotiations. The other options receive little support, including additional sanctions (11%), an international strategy of containment of Iran (9%), and a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities (7%).

While Iranian Americans from both major parties as well as Independents are most likely to say that the United States should continue negotiations if no deal is completed by the deadline, Democrats are considerably more likely to prefer this course of action (77% vs. 61% of Independents vs. 33% of Republicans). A significant number of Republican respondents (29%) say additional sanctions would be the best policy for the United States.

| If an agreement is reached between the P5+1 and Iran to limit Iran's nuclear program, what impact will it have on the following issues? | | | | |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|----------|
| | 2015 | | | |
| | Positive impact | Negative impact | No impact at all | Not sure |
| Expanding economic opportunities for the Iranian people | 75 | 7 | 12 | 6 |
| Improving Iran's relations with U.S. and West | 80 | 6 | 10 | 4 |
| Improving Iran's relations with regional neighbors | 58 | 14 | 18 | 10 |
| Political and governmental reform in Iran | 61 | 10 | 18 | 10 |
| Improving personal/civil rights for Iranian citizens | 66 | 7 | 19 | 8 |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Respondents were asked to consider what the impact would be on a series of issues if an agreement is reached between the P5+1 and Iran limiting Iran's nuclear program. Eight in 10 respondents (80%) say such an agreement would have a positive impact on Iran's relations with the United States and the West, with 6% saying the impact would be negative and 10% saying there would be no impact. Expanding economic opportunities for the Iranian people is viewed as a close second in terms of positive impact, with 75% of respondents saying there would be a positive impact on such opportunities if an agreement is reached. Two-thirds of respondents (66%) believe that there would be a positive impact on the improving of personal and civil rights for Iranian citizens, just 7% feel the impact would be negative and 19% say there would be no impact. About six in 10 respondents think an agreement would have a positive impact on political and governmental reform in Iran (61%) and improving Iran's relations with regional neighbors (58%).

V. OFAC

| Are you familiar with the United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ('OFAC')? | |
|--|------|
| | 2015 |
| Yes | 42 |
| No | 55 |
| Not sure | 2 |

| Have you been directly impacted as a result of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran? | |
|--|------|
| | 2015 |
| Yes | 24 |
| No | 76 |
| Not sure | 0 |

A majority of Iranian American respondents (55%) are not familiar with the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), while 42% are familiar with it.

One-quarter of those who are familiar with OFAC (or 10% of all respondents) say they have been directly impacted as a result of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran, while three-quarters of those familiar have not been impacted.

VI. General American Opinion

| Favorable/Unfavorable | | | | |
|------------------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|----------|
| | Favorable | Unfavorable | Not familiar | Not sure |
| Iranian Americans | 43 | 19 | 23 | 15 |
| The Iranian people | 35 | 29 | 22 | 15 |
| The Iranian government | 11 | 61 | 15 | 13 |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

U.S. respondents were asked if their overall impressions of Iranian Americans, the Iranian people, and the Iranian government are favorable or unfavorable, or if they are not familiar enough to make a judgment. Iranian Americans fare best, with 43% of U.S. respondents saying they hold a favorable view of the community compared to 19% who hold unfavorable opinions. Almost one-quarter (23%) say they are not familiar with Iranian Americans, and an additional 15% are unsure of their impressions. Younger U.S. respondents are the most positive, with a majority of those ages 18-29 (52%) having favorable views of Iranian Americans compared to 37% of those ages 50 and over.

The Iranian people are viewed favorably by 35% of U.S. respondents, while 29% view them unfavorably. Again, younger respondents are more likely to hold positive opinions (18-29: 44% vs. 65+: 33%).

Finally, just 11% of U.S. respondents have a favorable impression of the Iranian government, while 61% have an unfavorable opinion. Younger people have slightly higher rates of positive opinion (18-29: 14% vs. 65+: 2%), and significantly lower rates of unfavorable opinions (18-29: 48% vs. 65+: 74%).

| Should a nuclear deal be reached with Iran, nuclear-related sanctions may be lifted but the U.S. trade embargo prohibiting U.S. citizens from doing business in Iran as a "state sponsor of terrorism" will remain in place. Since Europeans do not have these additional sanctions, some U.S.-based business leaders worry that this may put Americans at a disadvantage in developing commercial ties with Iran. Are you concerned that Americans will be at a disadvantage with respect to economic engagement opportunities with Iran if the U.S. embargo against Iran is not lifted concurrently with the nuclear related sanctions? | |
|--|----|
| Yes | 27 |
| No | 35 |
| Not sure | 38 |

When asked if they are concerned that Americans will be at a disadvantage with respect to economic engagement opportunities with Iran if the U.S. embargo against Iran is not lifted concurrently with the nuclear-related sanctions, a plurality of American respondents (38%) are “not sure.” One-quarter of respondents (27%) say they are concerned, while 35% are not concerned about this issue.

Over the years, the U.S. government has provided for certain exemptions to the U.S. embargo with Iran allowing for transactions associated with family remittances, food, medicine, and personal communications tools. Should trade exemptions with Iran be ...

| | 2015 |
|---------------|------|
| Expanded | 17 |
| Kept the same | 40 |
| Stopped | 15 |
| Not sure | 29 |

Overall, U.S. respondents favor trade exemptions that allow for Iran to receive family remittances, food, medicine, and personal communication tools. Forty percent (40%) of Americans feel these exemptions should be kept in place, and an additional 17% think they should be expanded. Just 15% say these exemptions should be stopped. Almost three in ten U.S. respondents (29%) are not sure.

Demographics and Methodology

Demographics

| Iranian American Telephone Survey | |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| 18-29 | 10% |
| 30-49 | 29% |
| 50-64 | 44% |
| 65+ | 15% |
| Male | 57% |
| Female | 43% |
| Democrat | 45% |
| Republican | 13% |
| Independent/Minor Party | 28% |
| No Party | 13% |

| American Voters Online Survey | |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| 18-29 | 22% |
| 30-49 | 36% |
| 50-64 | 25% |
| 65+ | 17% |
| Male | 48.5% |
| Female | 51.5% |
| Democrat | 38% |
| Republican | 33% |
| Independent | 29% |
| No Party | 13% |

Methodology

Zogby Research Services (ZRS) was commissioned by PAAIA to conduct, in partnership with Zogby Analytics, a live operator telephone survey of 400 Iranian American adults. Samples are randomly drawn from purchased telephone Iranian surname lists. Up to four calls are made to reach a sampled phone number, respondents that were not available but qualified to respond were allowed to set appointments to be recalled within the time frame of the fieldwork. Based on a confidence interval of 95%, the margin of error for 400 is +/- 5.0 percentage points. This means that all other things being equal, the identical survey repeated will have results within the margin of error 95 times out of 100.

In addition, ZRS in partnership with Zogby Analytics conducted an online survey of 1,010 adults in the United States. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this interactive survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that one respondent can only access the survey one time. Using information based on census data, voter registration figures, CIA fact books and exit polls, we use complex weighting techniques to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion. Based on a confidence interval of 95%, the margin of error for 1,010 is +/- 3.1 percentage points. This means that all other things being equal, the identical survey repeated will have results within the margin of error 95 times out of 100.

Subsets of the data have a larger margin of error than the whole data set. As a rule we do not rely on the validity of very small subsets of the data especially sets smaller than 50-75 respondents. At that subset we can make estimations based on the data, but in these cases the data is more qualitative than quantitative. Additional factors can create error, such as question wording and question order.

Zogby research services, llc

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